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ABSTRACT:  Based on data from an original survey of senior HR executives in Japan 
and the United States, this paper provides empirical data for evaluating  institutional 
convergence.  In both countries, the headquarters HR function has shrunk and that employment 
decisions have become more decentralized.  However, because the pace of change has been more 
rapid in the U.S., the national gap has widened. Differences persist in other areas, such as the  HR 
executive’s role in strategic decisions, perceived power of the HR function, how executives 
balance shareholder and employee interests, and the consequences of these decisions for 
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During the 1990s,  capitalism was ascendant.  The Soviet Union had collapsed, China was 
pursuing free enterprise, and neoclassical economics ruled the academic roost. Yet some social 
scientists observed that there was not, nor had there ever been, such a thing as pure capitalism. 
Rather, capitalism came in different varieties, a point first made by the German historical 
economists in the nineteenth century, picked up in the 1960s by Andrew Shonfield (1965), 
among others;  in the 1970s by studies of  wage restraint and corporatism; and again in the 1990s. 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001)  
Today, capitalist nations vary along multiple dimensions. There are different national 
approaches to structuring the business-government relationship, everything from competition 
laws to systems for innovation.  Nations also differ in how they protect their citizens against risk-
-including unemployment,  sickness, and old age. Of recent interest are variations in the internal 
organization of corporations and in modes of corporate governance. One finds shareholder-
oriented governance in the U.S. and the U.K, statutory stakeholder governance in Europe, and 
voluntary stakeholder governance in Japan and other parts of East Asia. (Dore, 2000) 
Interactions between these various national sub-systems yield divergent macroeconomic 
results. Hence the “varieties of capitalism” literature suggests that there are different roads to 
prosperity, each with its own set of costs and benefits.  The force of this argument was undercut 
by the stellar performance of the U.S. economy in the 1990s as compared to its main rivals in 
Germany and Japan. By the end of the decade, the focus had shifted from analyzing institutional 
variety to predicting how quickly U.S. patterns of regulation, risk-sharing, and governance would 
take hold around the world. (Jacoby 2002a) 
Nowhere was the shift more noticeable than in Japan, a country that served as a model for 
a struggling U.S. economy in the 1980s and then, in the 1990s, became a model of how not to run 
a modern economy. In addition to high levels of coordination between business and government, 
Japan distinguished itself for having a mode of corporate governance that balanced different   3
stakeholders—shareholders, customers, banks, and employees—rather than, as in the U.S., giving 
exclusivity to shareholders.  The employees-as-stakeholder role derived from--and contributed to-
-such Japanese practices as  intensive training and long-term employment; the willingness to 
shelter employees from downturns; and ubiquitous enterprise unions that cooperated with 
management.  
A key element in the Japanese system was the headquarters HR department, which 
administered employment and labor relations.  Among its myriad duties, the HR department was 
in charge of rotating managers around the company and winnowing out people for senior 
positions. HR was linked to corporate governance indirectly—by grooming people for the  board 
of directors, comprised of management insiders—and directly through the board membership of 
the senior HR executive. 
Managers viewed HR as a beneficial posting since it was a place to network with other 
managers. It ranked about halfway down the list of functions that were precursors to a senior 
executive promotion--behind marketing but ahead of engineering, R&D, and  others. In the early 
1990s, one-third of corporate directors in non-manufacturing firms had previous experience in the 
HR function. (Tachibanaki, 1998; Inohara 1990) On the company board, the HR executive voiced 
employee concerns to other executives and served as the advocate of the seishain—the career 
employees—in strategic decision-making. 
In the United States, by contrast, the senior HR executive traditionally was low man—or 
woman—in the managerial hierarchy.  The function’s low status was reflected by a relatively 
high proportion of women in HR positions and relatively low pay for HR executives. (Jacoby 
2002b)    For the past fifty years or more, the powerhouse function of the U.S. corporation has 
been finance. 
At various times, however, HR did have its day in the sun. During the 1940s, HR (then 
called “personnel”) was temporarily elevated in status as U.S. companies accommodated to the 
rise of unions or sought ways to avoid them. In some nonunion companies, the HR executive   4
functioned as an employee advocate, being the two-way transmission point between employees 
and management. In the 1960s and 1970s, new regulations put HR in the position of having to 
develop systems for complying with the law on affirmative action, occupational safety, and other 
issues. As for corporate governance, companies at least gave lip service to the notion that the 
corporation was a social institution with responsibilities not only to shareholders but to 
employees, customers, and communities. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, most U.S. companies became increasingly 
financialized, undiversified, and  oriented to shareholder concerns. Ties between employees and 
companies grew weaker, and HR executives in these companies adapted, or were forced to adapt,  
to the status quo. They focused on flexibility and on treating employees as costs to be minimized. 
Some U.S. companies, however, sought competitive advantage not in market power but in having 
inimitable resources such as intellectual and organizational capital.  Here,  HR managers took a 
different approach, giving rise to Japanese-style emphases on participation and culture.   
Today there is pressure on Japanese companies to conform to U.S.-style corporate 
governance and to adopt market-oriented employment practices that would weaken the corporate 
HR function. Studying the role of the senior HR executive provides a window on the process of 
institutional adjustment in Japan  and allows us to see whether there is convergence to U.S. 
practices.  Is it, in fact, the case that HR is losing its high standing inside the Japanese corporation 
and becoming more like the U.S. system? 
As for the U.S., despite a huge prescriptive literature on HR, we know relatively little 
about what is happening to HR at the top of U.S. companies and how this is related to recent 
changes in corporate governance and other factors. Are HR executives losing influence as the 
focus shifts increasingly to labor-cost minimization?  Or is HR on the ascendant, either through 
an emphasis on intellectual capital or through a market-oriented alignment with shareholder 
interests? 
The Study   5
We conducted a mail survey of senior HR executives in large public U.S. and Japanese 
companies
1. We asked about various issues including the company’s HR structure, the 
involvement of headquarters in operating and strategic decisions, and relations between HR and 
other corporate functions. We also surveyed CFOs  (chief financial officers) in the United States.  
Out of about 1,000 surveys sent in each country, we had usable responses from 230 Japanese 
firms and from 145 U.S firms.   While the response rate may seem low
2, bear in mind that this is 
an elite survey---of senior corporate executives—in which response rates typically are modest. 
There is the possibility of response bias, although we did not find any difference in the industry 
and size distributions of the U.S. respondents and nonrespondents.   For the CFO survey, the 
number of respondents was low—only 81—but that was because, due to limited funds, we 
conducted but a single survey round for the CFOs. Of the 81 replies, 23 were from companies 
where the HR executive also replied, allowing for some interesting comparisons. 
Keep in mind that when the surveys were conducted in 2001, each country was at a 
different stage of the business cycle: the U.S. was at the tail end of a boom, with very low 
unemployment, precisely the conditions for HR to flourish. Japan was entering its second “lost 
decade”, during which employment, revenues, and profits grew slowly, or, in many instances, 
contracted.   
I. Overview of the Respondents 
Although the U.S. HR executives have various titles (vice president, senior vice president, 
director), the more important distinction is between senior HR managers who report to their CEO 
and those who report to someone else, either a chief operating officer or another executive.  
Sixty-three percent of the senior HR executives in the United States report to the CEO, which is a 
                                                 
1  The companies were listed on the New York or Tokyo Stock Exchange. The U.S. companies came from a database 
called Reference-USA. We selected only firms listed in the database that gave names for both the HR and finance 
executives. 
2 The U.S. and Japan response rates were 17 and 23 percent respectively.   6
major change since 1977, when only 30 percent of senior HR executives of similar companies 
were CEO reports.  (Janger, 1977: 37)   
Reporting to the CEO has real consequences. A close relationship to the CEO assimilates 
the HR manager more closely to the dominant (i.e., finance-driven) corporate mindset. Our 
survey found that CEO reports are significantly less likely (p <.05) than non-reports to say that 
they care about safeguarding employee jobs.  
As for the structure of HR, CEO reports are more likely to work in companies with lean 
headquarters HR departments and decentralized operations in which line managers make 
relatively more operating decisions than headquarters. Reporting to the CEO—being part of the 
senior management team—puts the HR executive in  a consultative rather than operational or 
advocacy role.  CEO reports are more likely than nonreports to say that they are involved in final 
decision-making on senior appointments (93 percent versus 55 percent) and on mergers and 
acquisitions (59 percent versus 22 percent). Not surprisingly, CEO reports are more likely than 
non-reports to perceive that HR has more power relative to other functions such as finance and 
marketing. 
In Japan, we did not ask about reporting to the CEO but instead asked for the respondent’s 
rank.  Japanese companies use standardized nomenclature for the hierarchy of senior 
management positions. About a fifth of the respondents were directors, meaning they served on 
the board of directors. Nearly three-fifths were general managers of the headquarters HR unit, the 
highest non-board rank.  The remainder held some lower rank. Managing directors were not 
different in terms of espoused values than respondents who held lower rank.  
In the United States,  HR continues to be a specialty more open to women than other 
executive functions. Thirty-five  percent of the HR respondents were female versus 11 percent for 
the CFOs. In Japan, on the other hand, senior management—regardless of function—is still an 
all-male preserve. None of our Japanese respondents was female.    7
  Career patterns also are different.  In the U.S., HR executives are specialized 
professionals who, on average, have spent 77 percent of their careers in the HR field. On the 
other hand, they are quite mobile. Mean tenure with the current employer is nine years. In Japan, 
the HR executives are a blend of specialists and generalists, with specialists predominating in 
manufacturing.  Because of lifetime hiring,  average tenure with current employer for a senior HR 
executive in Japan is twenty-six years, almost triple the U.S. figure. Consistent with weak 
professionalism is the fact that few Japanese executives (9 percent) planned a career in HR while 
still  in college, whereas 28 percent of U.S. executives had thought about a career in HR while in 
school, which is only a tad below the proportion reported thirty years ago. (Ritzer and Trice 
1969: 35) 
One striking difference has to do with labor relations. Sixty-five percent of employees in 
Japanese companies are union members versus only 16 percent at the  U.S. companies. Managers 
in both nations reported a decline in union membership from five years ago Yet although the U.S. 
companies  are lightly unionized,  senior managers remain concerned about unions. Thirty-
percent of the U.S. executives said that they are spending more time on union issues now than 
five years ago.   These companies are more likely to be make labor relations decisions at  
headquarters—rather than at the operating level-- than is true of companies spending less time on 
labor relations. Presumably the U.S. companies are concerned about maintaining their nonunion 
status, not usually an issue for large Japanese companies.    
II. Trends and Comparisons  
  The following section examines recent trends in Japan and the United States, comparing 
the two countries along six dimensions : i) resources flowing to the HR function ii) operating 
authority of headquarters HR units  iii) HR’s strategic influence  
iv) employment practices  v) corporate governance and executive power and vi) executive values. 
  i)  Resource Allocation: Large  Japanese companies are cutting their  HR units and  
decentralizing responsibility for employment management.  The average number of employees in   8
headquarters HR units fell by 22 percent over the past five years, with deeper cuts occurring in 
large firms.  Headquarters staff has fallen more steeply than total employment, so that there are 
fewer headquarters staff per employee than five years ago; the current figure is 1/129 employees 
(versus 1/106 five years ago).  
As for the U.S. sample-- where firm size is larger than Japan’s and where most firms 
experienced employment growth from 1997 to 2001—the average number of staff in 
headquarters HR units increased by 4 percent. 
3  But if we calculate staff per employee,  we find 
that  U.S. companies failed to add staff as quickly as they added employees. Hence the ratio of 
staff  to employees fell from 1/140  in 1997 to 1/185 in 2001, much leaner than in Japan. In fact, 
the staffing gap widened  between the two countries.  
One reason for staff cuts is outsourcing. We asked about outsourcing of  HR activities 
such as benefits (including welfare programs), training, recruitment, pay systems, and HR 
information systems. In Japan, the greatest outsourcing is of welfare services  and  training. 
However,  a common type of “outsourcing” in Japan is when companies spin off  welfare or 
training activities and then purchase them from the formerly in-house units--a way of cutting 
costs, making headcount look smaller,  and boosting the parent company’s financial performance.   
This kind of  outsourcing  is really more akin to the U.S. practice of  an internal chargeback for 
use of HR services by internal clients. Nevertheless in Japan there is also outsourcing  to entirely 
independent third parties, partly to get expertise and partly to shift funding from capital 
investments to operating expenses.  Both domestic and foreign companies are active in this 
market in Japan, with the result that internal HR staff is shrinking and HR practices are becoming 
more generic.  
In general, U.S. outsourcing levels are slightly lower than in Japan, which is odd, since 
experts in the field indicate that the outsourcing market is newer in Japan. (Dash 2001)    What 
                                                 
3  This reverses a trend from earlier years:  average headquarters HR size fell 13 percent between 1990 and 1995. 
(Mohrman et al., 1996)    9
appears to be the case is that Japanese companies are achieving functional convergence with U.S. 
companies by relying both on conventional outsourcing and spinoffs of welfare and training 
units. 
 ii) Centralization of Operating  Authority:  Another reason for headquarters shrinkage is 
decentralization of decision-making. We asked respondents to tell us how the involvement of line 
and operating managers had changed over the previous five years. (see Table 1)  
In Japan, what once were core headquarters responsibilities—the assignment and 
evaluation of managers—are undergoing decentralization in roughly a third of surveyed 
companies. Divisions and business units now have greater control over the rotation and 
promotion of rank-and-file managers and there is greater scope for individual choice on 
assignments. Consistent with this is the reduced role of headquarters in managerial evaluation. 
This is due to the proliferation of  individualized performance appraisal methods. 
But while change is occurring in some companies, the central tendency is stasis. In the 
majority of companies, line involvement has remained the same. While attention in the press is 
often riveted on change, most companies have not changed. Headquarters HR units still hold 
substantial operating power relative to line managers for initial hiring, career rotation,  transfers, 
and the like. 
  When it comes to decentralization, the U.S. is moving faster than Japan, which is 
surprising, given that the U.S in the 1980s already was relatively decentralized  as compared to 
Japan.  Change-rate gaps are especially wide when it comes to decisions over business unit 
headcount. Line managers in the U.S. have much more freedom to make hiring and layoff 
decisions than is the case in Japan. Again, as with the data on resource flows, the impression is 
that, despite change in Japan, the gap between the two countries has remained the same or even 
widened. 
It’s possible that some of the  authority being given up by headquarters HR is going to HR 
staff elsewhere in the organization. Therefore we asked respondents to  assign  weights for the   10
five activities  previously mentioned--with weights distributed across line managers, unit  HR 
departments, divisional HR departments, and headquarters HR departments--so they sum to 100.  
The results are shown in Table 2. 
4   
   Here, notice several points. First, despite decentralization, operating decisions remain 
more centralized in Japan than in the United States.   This is a key finding. Second,  in neither 
country do sub-headquarters units have a substantial measure of operating authority;  they are 
squeezed between headquarters and line management. Third, in Japan, there is a strong positive 
correlation between headquarters operating authority and HR staff per employee.   That is, 
centralization is associated (r=.21, p <.01) with greater resources for headquarters, as one would 
expect.  In the U.S., while the relationship is also positive, it is not statistically significant; that is, 
there is no guaranteed payoff—in HR staff intensity—from centralization. 
iii.)  Strategic Influence:  Senior management periodically makes strategic decisions that 
affect the organization’s future. To assess the influence of the headquarters HR department on 
these decisions, we asked respondents to tell us at what stage(s) they were involved in five 
different business decisions related to growth:  mergers and acquisitions; investing in new 
locations; creating spinoffs; expanding sites; and closing sites. The stages—not mutually 
exclusive—include: drawing up the proposal; evaluating its financial consequences; final 
decision-making; and implementation. Respondents also indicated if they were never involved or 
if the event did not occur 
5  
Second, respondents told us what part they played in two other strategic decisions more 
closely related to HR concerns: the selection and remuneration of senior managers and the 
allocation of payroll budgets across corporate divisions. The choices--not mutually exclusive—
                                                 
4  Note that we create indices of the first and of the last columns in Table 2 that we refer to as “index of line 
operating authority” and “index of headquarter operating authority”, shown in the last row of Table 2. These indices 
are used in subsequent analyses.  
5  These stages originally were identified in  Marginson et al. (1993).    11
were: limited to the provision of information; regularly offering advice on the basis of the 
information; and regularly taking part in decisions; or no role. For the U.S. only, we asked CFOs 
to tell us about HR’s role and about their own role in these decisions. 
The striking thing about Table 3 is the high involvement of U.S. HR executives in 
strategic decisions as compared to their Japanese counterparts. With the exception of closing a 
facility, a majority of Japanese HR executives is not involved in these decisions, whereas non-
involvement rates for U.S. executives average only around ten percent. This is a sizeable gap. 
One explanation is that these issues are less salient in  Japan, where M&A activity is 
sporadic and where business conditions at the time of the survey were depressed, making for a 
low rate of expansion.  Hence the involvement gap is widest for these decisions. Conversely,  the 
rate of closures was about the same in the two countries, and spinoffs  were more prevalent in 
Japan.  On these two issues,  the involvement gap is smaller, especially at the earliest stage of 
drawing up a proposal.   
Both U.S. and Japanese executives are less involved in the “decisional” parts of these 
events—drawing up a proposal and making final decisions about it--than they are in its 
implementation   Also, U.S. executives who report to the CEO are more involved in these 
decisions, just as Japanese respondents who held the rank of managing director report higher 
levels of involvement. However,  there remains an involvement gap between CEO reports in the 
U.S. and managing directors in Japan. 
 Another type of strategic decision lies in the domain where HR strategy meets business 
strategy. These decisions include the selection and remuneration of senior executives—which 
affect the future management of the organization--and the allocation of payroll budgets across 
divisions—which determines how quickly divisions will grow. Again, we asked respondents to 
tell us what role they played in these decisions (see Table 4).   Here the gap between Japan and 
the United States is much smaller. Part of the explanation has to do with centralization in Japan.  
Another explanation is that there are national differences in business strategy:  Japanese   12
companies are more attuned to organic growth via development of core competencies—including 
human capital—whereas the dominant U.S. pattern is growth via acquisition and divestment of 
units that do not meet hurdle rates of return.  
iv) Employment Practices:  A striking similarity between Japan and the U.S.  is the 
proportion of full-time employees in the workforce of large corporations. In both countries, it 
stands at around 85 percent, with part-time and temporary employees making up the remainder.   
Yet these figures conceal very different approaches to structuring internal labor markets. When 
asked how they would fill vacancies for either managerial or non-supervisory employees, the 
Japanese companies showed a strong preference for internal candidates, whereas U.S. companies 
were inclined to give more consideration to external candidates. (Table 5) Note the startling fact 
that barely any U.S. employers give strong preference to internal candidates, whereas in Japan, 
around a third of companies  do so. Also, in Japan there are only very slight differences in hiring 
preferences for managerial and non-managerial employees, reflecting the persistence of single-
status employment policies.  But in the U.S. not only is there a cleavage between managerial and 
non-managerial employees, it is the managerial positions that receive fewer benefits from 
incumbency.  
In Japan, the strength of a firm’s internal labor market is related to the structure of its 
headquarters HR function. We found that headquarters operating authority (as defined in Table 2) 
is positively associated with strong internal labor markets for managerial employees (r=.17, p< 
.01).  Where incumbent managers are employed “for life,” headquarters is more likely to be 
involved with managerial rotations and  pay decisions. Internal labor markets for non-supervisory 
employees also are associated with HR centralization, but the relationship is weaker than for 
managerial employees. Finally, Japanese companies with the strongest internal labor markets and 
greatest HR centralization also are  the companies with the most intensive staffing levels (HR 
staff per employee).     13
When we turn to the United States, patterns are less evident. Few of the internal labor 
market measures are significantly related to HR variables such as centralization or staff intensity.  
The one exception—and it is telling—has to do with corporate governance. As the number of 
persons on the board who have HR backgrounds increases, so does the strength of internal labor 
markets (r=.20, p<.05).   
v) Corporate Governance and Executive Power:  An HR-relevant change in Japanese 
corporate governance is the advent of Sony-style corporate officer systems (shikkyo yakuin), 
which have caught on in the last five years.  This system creates a small U.S.-style executive 
board comprised of insiders and an occasional outsider, while relegating operating managers—
who used to comprise the main board--to a managing committee. Twenty-eight percent of 
respondents said their firms had  adopted the system, a figure that jibes with other surveys. 
(Ahmadjian, 2001)    Because of this change, and because of investor pressure  to reduce board 
size, Japanese boards are smaller, on average, than in past years: Respondents report a mean 
board size of 15  persons: 11 for companies with the corporate officer system and 16 for other 
firms.  Ten years ago, some  boards had fifty or more persons and the mean was around thirty. 
(Schaede 1994) 
These changes have not diminished HR’s influence, however. We found no difference 
between companies with and without the corporate officer system in the perceived power of the 
headquarters HR unit or in its influence over strategic decisions. The implication is that the 
corporate officer system has not yet changed power relations inside the Japanese company. 
Even where the corporate officer system is in place, Japanese boards continue to have 
persons serving on them with a background in HR.  We asked respondents to tell us how many 
board members had executive experience in the HR area:  58 percent said one or two; 19 percent 
said three or four; and 4 percent  said five or more, giving a total of 80 percent on the board with 
HR executive experience.  The enterprise union also plays a role in grooming managers for the 
board. We asked how many board members  previously  held a leadership position in the   14
enterprise union: 25 percent said one or two; 14 percent said three or four;  and 6 percent said 
five or more, for a total of 45 percent. While there may be some overlap here, half of the 
companies with HR-experienced board members had zero board members with a union 
background,  it’s still the case that 85 percent of companies have at least one person on their 
board with either HR and/or union leadership experience. 
In contrast, the U.S. respondents reported far fewer members of their boards with 
experience in the HR area: only 34 percent.. Moreover, major U.S. companies rarely have their 
incumbent HR executive on the board. Data from Korn/Ferry for the 900 largest U.S. companies 
show that only six companies have their HR manager on the board. While one might chalk this 
up to the tendency of U.S. boards to seek outside members,  it’s interesting to note that 92 of the 
companies nevertheless gave a board seat to their CFO. 
6  Moreover, within the same company, 
finance is more likely to report to the CEO than is HR:  95 percent versus 72 percent. That is, in 
nearly a quarter of the matched HR-CFO pairs, the CFO reports to the CEO but the HR executive 
does not. 
  We asked HR executives to tell us what was the relative power of different headquarters 
departments to influence strategic decisions. (Table 6) While we did not define power, the results 
suggest that respondents understood the meaning of the word and gave consistent replies. 
(Perrow, 1970)   Rated on a scale of 1 to 10, with ten being “most influential,” the top department 
in the U.S. was finance,  followed by marketing , production, planning or strategy  and HR. The 
only department rated lower than HR was R&D.   When CFOs were asked to answer this 
question, they gave similar rankings:  finance rated itself as the top department  and rated HR as 
the weakest, even weaker than R&D. These were precisely the same findings for the matched-
                                                 
6  Korn/Ferry data as of February 2002, courtesy of Caroline Nahas and Jeremy Lawrence.   Assuming that the non-
shikko yakuin companies have an HR director  on the board, the contrast is sharp: 70 percent of Japanese firms 
versus 0.6 percent of U.S. firms have the  HR executive on the board.   15
pair companies: both CFOs and HR executives rated finance as the most powerful function, and, 
again, finance rated HR as being much weaker than HR rated itself.   
However, when asked which departments have gained or lost power to influence strategic 
decisions over the past five years, U.S. HR executives rated the HR function as the biggest 
relative gainer. Seventy-five percent of the HR respondents said that HR has gained power, with 
finance coming in second at 50 percent.  But  this view is not shared by CFOs, 70 percent of 
whom say finance has gained power, followed by planning (45 percent), and HR (26 percent).  
Of great interest is the finding that, in the United States, the perceived power of the 
finance function is moderated by having people on the board of directors with an HR 
background. As the number of these persons increases, the perceived power of finance goes down 
(r=.-29, p<.01). Having people with an HR background on the board also is significantly 
associated with career-type employment policies for managerial and non-managerial employees, 
as we have seen. 
Thus, HR and finance executives agree that finance rules the roost. This hardly comes as a 
surprise, given the prevalence of the M-form type of corporate organization, the pace of M&A 
activity, and the meteoric rise of stock options and equity prices during the study period.  HR and 
finance do not agree on HR’s status, however. The CFOs see HR as gaining and holding less 
power than the HR executives think is the case. Unfortunately, there is no way of judging whose 
perception is correct. But it seems plausible that HR—the underdog-- has greater reason to pump 
itself up and to overstate its influence than finance has to understate it. 
The internal decision-making process of Japanese companies is different from U.S. firms.  
When asked about power,  Japanese respondents said the top department  was  planning, which 
typically is a small unit attached to the president’s office that handles major issues of 
organizational design, such as spinoffs.  (Table 6) Marketing came in second,  finance and HR 
were third,  while production and R&D were farther down. Thus, even if Japanese and U.S. HR   16
managers are equally prone to hubris, it’s still the case that Japanese HR managers rank 
themselves ahead of their U.S. counterparts. 
However, when Japanese executives were asked which departments had gained or lost 
influence during the past five years, they were less likely than their American counterparts to say 
the gainer was HR: only 40 percent said HR had gained power. The big gainer in Japan was the 
planning department, with 54 percent saying it had gained power. Only 37 percent said finance 
had gained power. 
 Thus,  finance is not the top function in Japan, nor does it dominate HR. Rather, it is the 
planning department –which specializes in corporate organization from a strategic rather than a 
financial perspective—which holds power and is gaining more of it.  There is no observable trend 
toward the financialization of strategic decision-making in Japan. Stock options – a key 
mechanism in the U.S. for aligning management decision-making to shareholder interests – 
remain uncommon. Only nineteen percent of the companies said that they used options, while an 
additional ten percent said that they were considering them. Other studies have found that, when 
Japanese companies do offer stock options, they account for a trivial portion of total 
compensation. In the U. S., however, options are used by nearly all companies (97 percent), 
although the majority (62 percent) of firms  pay them only  to their managerial employees and 
then usually only to senior and divisional executives, the upper crust of management.   There is a 
link between this kind of shareholder-oriented compensation and the structure of HR decision-
making: the greater a company’s reliance on stock options and other market-oriented forms of 
compensation, the more decentralized are its HR activities (r=.23, p<.01). 
The perceived power of the headquarters HR function does have consequences: for the 
unit’s strategic influence, for its role in the organization, and for the strength of its internal labor 
markets. Table 7 identifies Japanese and U.S. companies in the lower and upper quartiles of 
perceived HR power, with HR power normalized on the mean for all functions.  (We call this   17
“relative power”.)
7  In both Japan and the U.S., high relative HR power is associated with 
stronger internal labor markets for managers; greater centralization of operating decisions; and 
greater influence over executive career decisions, budgetary allocations, and strategic business 
decisions. While HR power is associated with larger staffs, it is not associated with higher 
staffing ratios (staff per employee). Perhaps power is related to the sheer number of employees—
which makes HR more salient—while staffing ratios are affected by economies of scale. 
vi.) Values:  One would expect—and studies have found-- Japanese and U.S. managers to 
hold different values due to national differences in culture,  career patterns,  and  corporate 
governance.(Hofstede,  2001)   Table 8 presents data from surveys asking how important to the 
manager were various issues  and concerns. It includes data from a 1993 survey of Japanese 
corporate directors, which gives some perspective on changes in Japan during the 1990s.  We 
expect this group to be less  inclined to hold traditional HR values, even in 1993, so any gap 
between this group and current HR executives is probably an understatement of changes in 
executive values since 1993. 
First, as regards Japan over the period 1993-2001,  what is striking is how executive 
attitudes have changed: share price value has become slightly more important and market share 
less important. Part of this may be related to cyclical economic factors rather than secular trends.  
Japanese managers stress dividends and market share less than in 1993 because their markets are 
shrinking and profits  (to pay dividends) are thin or nonexistent, while in the United States, the 
opposite situation prevails (or did until 2001).  
However, the uptick in the importance accorded share price value is probably a secular 
change, reflecting the advent of a shareholder-value ethos in Japan. There remains a sizeable 
difference in the emphasis placed on stock prices in Japan and in the U.S, however.  For U.S .HR 
executives,  share price ranks second in importance (after fair treatment),  while in Japan share 
                                                 
7  Respondents rated the various functions on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being most powerful.   18
price comes in at seventh place. And when we look at CFOs in the U.S., who are probably closer 
to the corporate mainstream than HR, we see share price being given more importance than 
anything else. 
Conversely, Japanese HR managers give  heavier weight to job security, ranking it their 
second most important concern, while their  U.S. counterparts rank it ninth. But when it comes to 
being concerned about employee morale and fair treatment, Japanese and U.S. HR managers are 
close to each other, just as they are fairly close on internal management issues (hiring more 
managers, department budgets, coordination with other departments.)  In short, there are  national 
differences on the values that form the core of corporate governance—share prices and job 
security—and  smaller differences on  other issues. 
Are these values related to organizational variables such as HR power?   Table 9 
examines two key values—maximizing share price and safeguarding employee jobs. For each 
country and each value, we identify those who rate the value as being of low or   high importance 
and display the mean values of other variables associated with each category.   
For  the U.S,  we hypothesized that executives with strong HR career backgrounds would 
show weaker support for shareholders and stronger support for employees’ jobs  than those 
having less professional backgrounds.  The first but not the second hypothesis is supported by the 
data in Table 9.  (For Japan, variations in the percent of career spent in HR do not have the same 
meaning.) We also expected that a strong union presence would affect an HR manager’s values in 
a fashion similar to professionalism, but there is no relationship between a firm’s unionization 
level and its manager’s values. 
However, there is a relationship between relative power and manager values. In both 
countries,  HR executives who hold “shareholder” values  (either to maximize share prices or to 
put a low value on safeguarding employees’ jobs) rate their headquarters HR unit as being 
relatively powerful. (The size of this group is much larger in the U.S. than Japan.)   Recall also 
our earlier finding that, in the U.S., CEO reports are more likely to hold shareholder values and to   19
rate their departments as relatively powerful. It is tempting to think that, in the U.S. at least, the 
causality runs from values to power: those executives who put shareholders ahead of  employees 
gain power for their units and themselves by demonstrating allegiance to the dominant mindset of 
senior management. 
 It may well be that a similar mindset is starting to develop inside Japanese corporations 
and that those HR managers who align themselves with it are able to boost their influence. 
However, the power differential associated with shareholder values is smaller than in the United 
States, so that there is less of an incentive for Japanese HR executives to adopt shareholder values 
as a strategy for maximizing their status.  
As regards strategic influence, again the U.S. pattern is for HR managers who hold 
shareholder values to have more influence than managers with stakeholder values.  In Japan, 
however, there is little evidence of this effect. In fact, those executives who care most about 
safeguarding employee jobs tend to have greater influence. Again,  there is less incentive for 
Japanese HR executives to adopt shareholder values.  
III. Discussion 
 The data show clearly the persistence of distinctive Japanese and American approaches to 
HR decision-making. In Japan there is greater centralization of decisions and  more intensive use 
of  central HR staff. Centralization and staff intensity are related to the fact that headquarters 
administers internal labor markets for managerial and nonsupervisory employees. The HR 
function ranks high in the corporate hierarchy and influences strategic decisions related to 
executive careers and payroll allocation.   HR executives still have direct and indirect (by persons 
with an HR background) participation on company boards.  The majority of HR executives 
espouse “stakeholder” rather than “shareholder” values. Hence two of the three Japanese 
pillars—enterprise unions and employment security—remain in place in large companies  As for 
seniority--the third pillar—it is of declining relative importance, although the share of pay based 
on individual performance is well below U.S. levels.   20
Change is occurring in Japan, however, as evidenced by cutbacks in HR staff , 
outsourcing of HR activities, and leaner staffing ratios.  While some of this is just belt tightening, 
there are signs that HR is being singled out, especially in very  large companies.  Although  
headquarters HR departments are in charge of implementing the transition to performance-based 
pay,  the shift entails decentralization of operating authority. 
 Corporate governance also is changing, with nearly a third of companies utilizing the 
corporate officer system. Although the effects of this system are modest, and although stock 
options remain rare, nevertheless a beachhead has been established for shareholder values.  A 
minority of Japanese HR executives currently espouse these values and, given the finding that 
such values are associated with HR executive power, they could become more widespread in the 
future. In other words, HR executives may have to choose between loyalty to shareholders and 
loyalty to the shain, creating the potential for future shifts in values and practices. In short,  Japan 
is moving—albeit gradually—toward the market pole on the market-organization continuum, 
although there are fewer incentives for this to occur than in the United States. 
As for large U.S. companies, while there is internal hiring and attention to organizational 
factors, employment and pay remain more market-oriented than in Japan.  Hence HR decision-
making is a line responsibility and headquarters HR stands at low rank in the corporate hierarchy. 
While both countries are decentralizing and cutting headquarters staff, the process is occurring 
more rapidly in the United States, even though the U.S. started from a more market-oriented 
position back in the 1980s.  Thus on the organization-market continuum, the gap between the 
U.S. and Japan is widening, not narrowing. 
The same divergence is occurring in corporate governance. Ten years ago, U.S. 
corporations already were more finance-oriented than Japanese firms. Since then, the United 
States has financialized more rapidly than Japan, so that finance is the powerhouse in the 
executive suite.  Its logic dominates other functions and drives the marketization of employment.  
U.S. boards are shareholder-oriented and some even have CFOs serving on them.  HR, on the   21
other hand, is almost never represented--directly or indirectly--on corporate boards. HR’s modest 
effect on corporate governance is partly due to HR’s weak power base and low standing in the 
eyes of pivotal figures like CFOs.  It’s also the result of  HR executives lacking a distinctive 
orientation. HR executives espouse the same values as CFOs when it comes to job security and 
share prices. The small number of  HR managers who buck  convention pay a price by being  less 
powerful than their peers. While American HR executives do care about issues like equity and 
fairness, they have not succeeded  in persuading other managers to share their concerns. 
To put it another way, finance has influenced HR much more than the other way around.   The 
result is that in corporate governance, too, the relative positions of Japan and the U.S. have 
widened, not narrowed, over the last ten years. 
8 
While the low status of American HR is an old story, what is new is the growing number 
of HR executives who report to their CEO,  espouse shareholder values, and consider themselves 
part of the senior management team. In this new constellation, HR’s  role is to work closely with 
the CEO on strategic decisions such as mergers and acquisitions and to help with executive 
hiring, the importance of which has grown in recent years as both executive pay and turnover 
have risen. Thus the shift to the market in the U.S. has not erased but actually enhanced some of 
the senior HR executive’s responsibilities. In addition, headquarters oversees the outsourcing 
process and designs companywide  systems for benefits and other pay processes. But this is a 
smaller role than in the past, and, until HR can define its organization-specific competence and 
how it contributes to strategic decision-making, there is the risk of further outsourcing, even of 
the executive pay and selection role.  
A gap that  we observed between the U.S. and Japan had to do with the senior executive’s 
role in strategic decisions about restructuring. U.S. executives, especially those who report to the 
                                                 
8  We replicated a question recently asked of Japanese directors (IIRA 2000:105) and put it to the U.S. CFOs: “Do 
you agree that corporations are the property of shareholders and employees merely one factor of production? “ In 
Japan, 9 percent of directors agreed with this question; in the U.S., 67 percent of CFOs agreed. The split is striking.    22
CEO, are more involved in these decisions than their Japanese counterparts. Interestingly, those 
U.S. executives who are most inclined to hold shareholder values are also most involved in these 
strategic decisions, whereas the opposite is true in Japan, reducing the payoff to Japanese HR 
executives from switching  to shareholder values. 
There is a much smaller involvement gap between Japan and the U.S. when it  comes to 
strategic decisions about executive pay, careers and divisional budgets.  Here Japanese executives 
are more involved than their U.S. counterparts. It’s possible that the differences between the U.S. 
and Japan are due, in part, to differences in the meaning of “strategy.” For Japanese companies, 
the key strategic decisions are related to building the company’s core competence while  
reallocating employees to meet those needs. For a U.S. company, growth is more likely to occur 
through acquisitions and divestments, that is, through financially-determined criteria for 
restructuring. 
IV. Summary 
 Executive decision-making, employment practices, and corporate governance are a  
totality of interrelated parts that situate companies  on an organization-market continuum.  
Aggregating across companies, we get a distribution that includes national means and variances.  
There is overlap in the national distributions due to industry-specific factors such as technology.  
On the other hand, despite the shift to the market in recent years,  the central tendency in Japan 
remains some distance from the central tendency in the United States due to national differences 
in corporate organization and social norms.  Moreover, the distance between the countries has 
probably widened as the U.S. has moved more rapidly to the market-oriented end of the 
continuum.  This might account for the fact that Japanese observers are impressed with the 
changes that have occurred in Japan in recent years—because their comparison point is the 
Japanese past--while those visiting from the U.S. see a system that is transforming very slowly, 
because their comparison point is the United States.   23
  HR executives in U.S. companies have carved out distinctive niches for themselves; they 
are hardly impotent or unimportant. Their power base is situated at the margin between the labor 
market and the organization, and they focus heavily on executive, rather than operating, issues. 
Despite higher levels of HR professionalism American HR managers are more inclined to see 
employees as means to an end—the end being higher share prices—than as ends in themselves.. 
In Japan, the HR function’s power rests inside the organization: on career employment practices,  
the centralization of operating decisions, and on dealings with the enterprise union. Executives 
are somewhat more inclined to see employees as ends, that is, as stakeholders with a claim to 
fairness and security. In short, we have a paradox: both Japanese and U.S. firms are becoming 
more market-oriented yet national differences persist and may even be widening.  
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Table 1: Change in Line Involvement Over Five Years:  
(percent of firms) 
 Increased  Same  Decreased 
  Japan      U.S.  Japan          U.S.  Japan        U.S. 
Introduce or modify 
participation plans  23           44  66                  52  11               4 
Develop policies toward 
unions  18           15  75                  76  6                 9 
Decisions on business unit 
headcount  21           46  72                  46  8                 8 
Job assignment of managers  29          40  63                  52  8                 7 
Performance evaluation of 
managers  39          53  57                  43  4                 4 
 
 
Table 2: Division of Responsibility for HR Activities, Japan and United States 
(Weights sum to 100) 
 
  Line managers 
    Japan          US     
Unit HRD    
Japan          US      
Divisional HRD    
Japan          US         
Headquarters HRD   
Japan          US      
Introduce or modify 
participation plans  52               45  11             12  13              17  25              27 
Develop policies 
toward unions  11               17  7                 9  9                16  73              58 
Decisions on business 
unit headcount  19               50  12                9  18              14  50              28 
Job assignment of 
managers  23               62  5                  9  16               14  57              16 
Performance evaluation 
of managers  41               65  5                   8  15               12  38              15 
Operating Authority 
Index Value  28.9           50.5      48.9           26.6 
 
 
Table 3: Role of HR in Strategic Business Decisions in Japan and the  U.S. 
{percent checking stage} 












  J        US  J          US  J              US  J            US  J         US  J       US 
Merger or 
acquisition 
 10             32  7              61  14         47  41          85  38        3  66         18 
Creation of  
spin-off 
43             42  14            56  7           46  48          72  24       11  32          58 
Invest in  
new site 
9               33  8              45  11        38  34          62  47       22  37          21 
Expand existing 
site 
14            27  12            43  11        36  38           64  42        18  24         18 
Closure of 
existing site 
42            48  16           56  10         55  54            77  16          3   22          19 
 
*”Did not occur” is given as ratio to all respondents. Other columns show the ratio only for those companies 
where the event occurred.   25
Table 4: Role of HR in Strategic Personnel Decisions 
{percent checking role) 
 
 Provide   
information 
Offer advice 
based on  
information 
Take  









15         8  62        25  67    80  1         7 
Determining 
size and allocation 
of payroll  
budgets 
across divisions 
10       20  32        33  74    45  8        16 
 
 
Table 5: Preferred Methods for Filling Vacancies 
 
                                                                   Japan                       United States 
  Managers       Non-
supervisory 
employees    
Managers            Non-
supervisory 
employees     
Only consider internal candidates  35  30    0   1 
 First priority to internal; recruit 
outside only when needed 
54 54   41  59 
 Consider both internal and external 
candidates  
11 15   59  40 
 Prefer recruiting external candidates   0   1   1   0 
 Mean ILM index value *   1.238   1.121    .392   .604 
* Consideration of internal candidates is coded as 2;  giving first priority to internal candidates and recruit outside 
only when needed is coded as 1; consider both internal and external candidates is coded as 0; and  prefer recruiting 
external candidates  is coded as –2, for both managerial  and non-supervisory positions. 
 
 
Table 6: Perceived Power of Headquarters’ Functions 
  Japan HR 
 [rank] 
U.S. HR  
[rank} 
Finance  5.7 [3]  8.4 [1] 
Human Resources  5.7 [3]  6.1 [5] 
Marketing/Sales  6.7 [2]  7.1 [2] 
Planning/Strategy  8.2 [1]  6.3 [4] 
Production/Operations 5.2 [5]  6.4 [3] 
R&D  5.4 [4]  5.4 [4] 
   26
Table 7: Relative Power of the HR Function and Corporate Outcomes 
                                      Japan                                               United States 




relative HR power 
Lower quartile, 
relative HR power 
Upper quartile, 









0.96 1.15  .64  .58 
Number of 
headquarters staff 
18 23  23  75 
Staff  per  employee  1/121  1/140 1/209 1/211 
Centralization of 
operating decisions 
47.4  50.3 22.1 25.9 
Strategic influence:  
- senior executives 
& payroll allocation 




















Table 8:  Executive Values 
(“What is important to you in your job?” 1=not important, 4= most important) 
  1993 Japanese 
Directors * 





Raising dividends  2.6 2.2 2.6 1.7 
Share price   2.0 2.3 3.3 3.6 
Market share  2.9 2.2 2.9 2.7 
Diversify & 
expand into new 
markets 
2.9 2.5 2.4 2.5 
Improve employee 
morale 
NA 3.6 3.3 2.7 
Insure employees 
are treated fairly 
NA 3.0 3.4 2.7 
Safeguard 
employees’ jobs 
3.3 3.2 2.1 1.8 
Increase number of 
management 
positions 




1.5 1.4 1.3 1.1 
Coordinate with 
other departments 
2.4 2.8 3.2 NA 
Make contribution 
to society 
2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2 
* 1993 data courtesy of Fujikazu Suzuki,   RENGO Research Institute for Advancement of Living 
Standards (RIALS), Tokyo. 
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Table 9 
Correlates of HR Executive Values* 
 
                           Maximize  Share Price                                   Safeguard Employees’ Jobs 
  Japan Japan U.S.  U.S.  Japan Japan U.S.  U.S. 
















% career  
in HR 
43 36 82 76 41 40 78 72 
% Union  64 65 15 16 58 66 17 12 
Relative  
HR power 




1.8    1.7 3.3 4.3 1.5 1.8 4.3 3.8 
  N  137 88  21 120 36 189  100 42 
 
* “Low importance” :  respondent  rated the value as not important or somewhat important;  “high 
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